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THE TEACHING OF ECONOMICS 
A RADICAL APPROACH TO ECONOMICS: BASIS FOR A 
NEW CURRICULUM" 
By RICHARD C .  EDWARDS, ARTHUR MACEWAN, and the 
STAFF OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 125 
Harvard University 
The purpose of this paper is to outline a radical 
approach to economics and to suggest how several 
important social problems might be dealt with in 
that framework. Our effort to develop a new cur- 
riculum is motivated by the conviction that the 
orthodox approach to economics cannot deal with 
the important problems of modern society. 
Orthodox economic analysis as presented from 
the elementary course through the graduate 
seminar is based upon an acceptance of the status 
quo in social relations. Microanalysis presupposes 
the individualistic ownership and decision-making 
systems typical of capitalist societies, and in this 
narrow context the pecuniary behavior of firms 
and individuals is examined. In  macroanalysis, 
when the aggregate operations of these individual 
units are the subject matter, attention is focused 
on the fiscal and monetary adjustments necessary 
to keep the system smoothly functioning. All in 
all, the curriculum of modem economics is one 
of philosophic marginalism: existing social rela- 
tions are taken as a datum and the problem is one 
of administering the system by adjustments 
around the edges. 
The marginalist approach is useful only if, 
accepting the basic institutions of capitalism, one 
is concerned with its administration. 
If one questions the virtue of capitalism as a 
system, then the basic social relations and the 
institutions of the system themselves must be 
subjected to analysis. A new approach is neces- 
sary. 
The old approach-that which accepts capital- 
ism and is in general the basis of present eco- 
nomics curricula-cannot deal with the problems 
of modern society. All that the curricula say about 
the war in Vietnam is how it can be financed more 
efficiently. The very existence of imperialism is 
denied. Racism, it is taught, has its origins in 
personal preferences, and the poverty of blacks 
and others is "explained" in terms of their low 
productivity. The destruction of the environment 
enters the curricula only as an aside when the 
existence of "externalities" is pointed out as 
limiting the theory. The subjugation of women, 
the meaninglessness of work activities, and the 
alienation of workers are topics which do not 
enter the curricula a t  all. Socialist alternatives and 
the process of revolution are examined only in 
terms of the value system of a capitalist environ- 
ment. 
I t  is our contention that such issues-their 
historical existence, causes, dynamics, and conse- 
auences-should be central to a new economics 
*Social Sciences 125, "The Capitalist Economy: curriculum. This curriculum would reflect the 
Conflict and Power," is a course offered in the ~enera l  motif of modern American capitalism: conflict 
Education Program of Harvard College. We requested and power. Attention would be focused upon the that the course be "cross-listed" in the Department of 
Economics so that it could count toward concentration basic economic institutions of capitalism and the 
credit for economics majors. The Harvard Department class divisions which those institutions foster. 
of Economics did not grant that request. The staff has 
met on a weekly basis since the autumn of 1968 to work 
out the substance of a radical approach to economics 
and to form the course around that substance. The 
ideas put forth in this paper are the products of the 
group. Their expression here has been the responsibility 
of Richard Edwards and Arthur MacEwan. Other 
members of the group, which is about half faculty and 
half teaching fellows, are: Keith Aufhauser, Peter 
Bohmer. Roaer Bobmer. Samuel Bowles, Herbert 
In  Sections I1 and I11 we lay out a basic sub- 
stantive argument for a radical approach to eco- 
nomics, which can be summarized as follows. 
We begin with an analysis of the fundamental 
capitalist institutions. These institutions func- 
tion so as to limit the range of social outcomes 
available; we show how the social problems men- 
tioned above (income inequality, alienation, 
- .  
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economic system. Therefore, of the limited social 
outcomes potentially available, there is a tendency 
to choose those outcomes least conducive to a 
decent society. We discuss (in Section 111) how 
this power is exercised, particularly through the 
state, in the service of class interests. In  Section 
IV we conclude with some remarks about methods 
of teaching. A statement on grading is included as 
an appendix. 
11. ConfEict, Power, and Institutions 
The problems we have cited as providing the 
motivation for a new economics curriculum- 
imperialism, inequality, alienation, racism, etc.- 
directly involve economic conflicts; that is, in 
each case there are social groups with contradic- 
tory economic interests. Conflicts are decided 
through the exercise of power and through the 
operations of institutions. More precisely, power 
-the ability of groups or individuals to resolve 
conflicts in their favor-is not exercised in a 
vacuum; rather it is always exercised within a 
well-defined environment of economic institutions 
which place strict limitations on its scope of opera- 
tion. 
For example, in the determination of wages in 
a capitalist society, the institutional environment 
narrowly confines the scope in which collective 
bargaining, a process involving power, takes place. 
First, the bargaining is predicated on the assump- 
tion that the struggle is one over distribution of 
"excess profits"; that is, over what is left after all 
the "costs" of production ("normal" profits and 
socially unnecessary expenditures such as ad- 
vertising, as well as socially necessary costs) have 
been subtracted from total revenues. In  the 
context of capitalism, the size of these costs is 
nonnegotiable. Indeed, in the context of capital- 
ism, it would likely be against the interests of the 
workers involved to cut into these costs because 
doing so might force the firm out of business. 
Second, once a negotiated agreement regarding 
wages has been reached, it can often be vitiated by 
price increases. Thus, both before and after its 
operation, power in the bargaining situation is 
severely constrained by the institutions of the 
system. 
One hypothesis which lies a t  the core of a 
radical approach to economics is that basic eco- 
nomic institutions to a large extent determine the 
nature of social relations and the outcomes of 
social conflict processes; that is, social decision 
making is largely organized and effected through 
the basic economic institutions. This hypothesis 
involves two questions. First, to what extent do 
institutions directly determine social relations 
and the outcomes of social conflict processes? 
Second, to what extent is the distribution of 
power among groups and individuals determined 
by the structure of institutions? 
In  considering the role of capitalist institutions, 
we emphasize as basic (that is, system-defining) 
institutions the following:' the market in labor, 
in which labor is treated as a commodity and 
allocated on the basis of the highest bidder; con- 
trol of the work process by those who own and 
control capital,' including the concomitant loss of 
control by the worker over his activities during 
the hours of work; the legal relations of owner- 
ship, by which income distribution is determined 
through payments to owners for the use of their 
productive factors; homo economicus, the system 
of personality traits characteristic of and func- 
tional to capitalism, including especially the 
system of individual gain incentives; and the 
ideology which abstracts and organizes "reality" 
in such a way as to justify and facilitate the opera- 
tion of the other institutions. 
These institutions create several of the social 
problems we have mentioned: income inequality, 
alienation, destruction of the environment, and 
imperialism. Furthermore, racism and the sub- 
jugation of women become functional in a society 
organized by these institutions. The arguments we 
shall suggest next are intended to make explicit 
the links between the operation of capitalist 
institutions and these problems. 
The Consequences of Capitalist Institzctions: 
Income Inequality. Tendencies toward inequality 
are an integral part of the functioning of capitalist 
institutions. Consider first the consequences of a 
market in labor. In  order to insure that the vast 
majority of workers will sell their labor power on 
the market, it is important that workers not have 
the option to work for themselves; that is, it is 
necessary that workers own no factors of produc- 
tion other than their own labor [38, VIII] [49]. 
As a result, capital ownership must be concen- 
trated in the hands of a relatively small number 
of nonworkers. Furthermore, as long as material 
rewards are the main motivation for work, the 
incentive structure required to induce workers to 
acquire and apply productive skills must be char- 
1 See Polanyi in Dalton 1141, [IS] 1371 for discussions 
of the operation of capitalist institutions and their 
development. 
While "owners" and "controllers" are not neces- 
sarily the same persons, as a group they define the 
goals of the capitalist firm to be profit maximization; on 
this point Bee Baran and Sweezy [3] and Solow [52] 
who counter Galbraith (211. All we require here is that 
firms "approximately" maximize profits, or that they do 
so in the "long run." 
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acterized by significant inequalities in labor 
earnings.$ 
The capitalist's side of the production process 
makes similar demands. First, substantial reward 
differences are needed in order to induce entre- 
preneurs to perform their social functions as 
innovators, production organizers, and risk- 
takers. Second, given economies of scale in pro- 
duction (either technological or those deriving 
simply from market power, etc.) and given the 
institutional association between capital owner- 
ship and control of the productive process, con- 
centration of ownership necessarily develops. 
Finally, profit maximization leads to a rapid 
rate of technological change. I n  a market setting, 
the capacity to exploit profitable innovations 
depends on the ability to raise the necessary capi- 
tal. Once inequalities begin to develop (or given 
historic inequalities), this ability is unequally 
distributed. As a result, the rewards of techno- 
logical change, which are often considerable, tend 
to be distributed to those who are already a t  the 
top of the income distribution, lending a further 
tendency away from equality [SO]. The above 
tendencies of technological progress operate even 
in the absence of biases which directly reduce the 
labor share of income in the choice of capital- or 
labor-saving technology. In  a society with more or 
less competitive factor markets but with collective 
control by capitalists over research and develop- 
ment, it can easily be shown that the selection of 
the pattern of technological progress will be to the 
disadvantage of labor. 
These tendencies toward inequality derive 
directly from the fundamental institutions. We 
income is entirely determined by the operation of 
capitalist institutions. Income determination is- 
perhaps above all else-a struggle. One of the 
principal aspects of this struggle is the effort by 
groups to increase the prices of the factors they 
own. Thus, the income struggle can be viewed as 
a class struggle, where classes are defined in terms 
of their relation to the means of production. 
Alienatiolz. The leisure-labor dichotomy char- 
acteristic of neoclassical economic analysis reflects 
an acceptance of the notion that in general, labor 
or work activities will be nonfulfdling drudgery 
undertaken to secure an income, and that crea- 
tive activities leading to individual development 
must necessarily be nonwork ("leisure") activi- 
ties. There is considerable anthropological evi- 
dence that this division of life is historically 
specific to labor-market societies, and that pro- 
ductive activities have not always been separated 
from creative, developmental ones [14, pp. 19- 
251. 
Within capitalist society, the capitalist's con- 
trol of the work process means that the workers- 
that is, those who sell their labor on a market- 
do not determine the technological or social orga- 
nization of the work process; likewise, they do not 
determine what product will be produced or what 
the product will be used for. Thus, the worker is 
separated or alienated from both his work activi- 
ties and his product. Likewise, since labor power 
cannot be separated from the laborer himself, 
control by the capitalist of the worker's labor 
carries with i t  control of the worker's life during 
the work day.* 
Under these circumstances, work activities are 
would not argue, however, that the distribution of Marx 1391 provides the classical statement of the 
process of alienation. Readings based on the more 
Inequalities in conjunction with personal material modern situation include [22] [I21 [6] [28] [20]. 
incentives exist in some socialist societies as well as in 6 More generally, insofar as a trade-off exists be- 
societies. Meade [41] explains the dual role tween the quality of the work process and maximum 
of prices in a market economy, pointing out that prices profits, in capitalist society the former will always be 
which lead to efficient allocation may yield a very un- sacrificed to the latter. This situation is illustrated 
desirable income distribution. graphically below. 
profitability 
Uw 
Uc: Capitalists' preferences 
UW: Workers' preferences 
P: Capitalists' equilibrium 
Q: Workers' equilibrium 
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in general neither creative nor self-develop- 
mental.5 The worker has no intrinsic interest in 
either his direct activities or their goal, and moti- 
vation must then take the form of working for the 
extrinsic incentive of wages. As pointed out above, 
for wage incentives to be effective, considerable 
inequality (and therefore considerable reward for 
working properly) must exist. 
But solving the problem of motivation in an 
alienated work environment is not left to wages 
(and the requisite wage inequality) alone. In  
modern capitalist societies, the United States in 
particular, the educational system serves the func- 
tion of preparing workers for the conditions of 
their employment. The educational system disci- 
plines the work force. 
Most people on the job find little use for those 
cognitive abilities acquired in school, other than 
the most elementary ones (the "three R's"), or, 
insofar as they do, they could just as well have 
learned these abilities on the job. On the other 
hand, coming on time, following directions and 
learning to respect authority, learning to work for 
external incentives (grades), and budgeting time 
are modes of behavior, affective traits, which the 
school instills and the job requires. Thus the 
schools prepare, by experience, their students to 
function effectively in an alienated environment? 
The consequences of alienation are obviously 
very great. When the organization and purpose of 
one's major life role--i.e., work-are externally 
controlled and motivated, that role and life 
itself tend to become meaningless. Character 
development and self-expression are distorted 
and stiiled by the work environment and achieve 
only stunted realization through nonwork activi- 
ties. Cynicism-towards oneself, towards others, 
and towards society-tends to be the result. 
The worker's alienation can be viewed as a 
fragmentation of his existence: his working hours 
are not controlled (arranged, organized, or moti- 
vated) by him and are therefore fragmented from 
Of course, in a society where workers' preferences 
dominated, the transformation locus might look very 
different, due both to a different motivational orienta- 
tion of workers and conscious development of new 
technologies consonant with higher quality work. 
6 More on this argument, especially with regard to 
the role of grades, is provided in the appendix. Useful 
readings concerning the function of schools include [24] 
[48] [27] [19]. I t  should be noted that what has been 
I said about alienation and education in the capitalist environment could also be true in other modern, highly 
bureaucratized and organized societies. Thus, while the 
elimination of capitalism is a necessary condition for 
the elimination of this problem, i t  is not a sufficient 
condition. On the personality requirements of bureau- 
cracy, see [22] [42]. 
the rest of his existence. His family, his recrea- 
tion, his intellectual activity are not integrated 
with work activity which dominates his life.? 
Furthermore, even his work activities are frag- 
mented: capitalist production drives towards a 
technology with an ever finer division of labor, 
so the worker cannot even participate in produc- 
tion of a complete product. 
Alienation is not a "cost" to workers which can 
be recouped through a higher supply price of 
labor. I n  the first place, workers are not able to 
extract higher wages as "compensation" because 
there are few if any meaningful nonalienating 
alternatives available to them; that is, alienation 
is pervasive throughout the capitalist economy. 
Furthermore, insofar as a variety of work condi- 
tions does exist, stratification of labor markets 
insures that persons in alienating work environ- 
ments have only similar environments as alterna- 
tives (a bureaucrat typically does not have the 
option of becoming a doctor). Also, the lack of 
creative, self-developmental work activities in- 
sures that workers will not demand such a work 
environment: their preferences (like everyone 
else's) are molded by their environment, and the 
absence of nonalienating alternatives allows 
workers no basis on which to change their prefer- 
ences. 
Destruction of the Environment. Capitalism is 
usually credited-by Marx, Schumpeter, and 
many others-as being a system which attains 
maximum output expansion from a given resource 
base. Markets and homo economicus prove to be 
powerful tools for organizing an economy towards 
growth. The ideology of capitalism, in turn, places 
high value on the rise of material output. 
The acceptance of aggregate output per se as 
an indicator of welfare, however, would be a t  best 
a questionable procedure. The prices a t  which 
aggregate output is valued are reflections of the 
existing distribution of income and the prefer- 
ences engendered by the system. They therefore 
cannot be endowed with any objective welfare 
meaning. Furthermore, the very process of out- 
put expansion has consequences outside of the 
market which are detrimental to social welfare. 
The capitalist growth process has historically 
involved the fracture of community. This process 
takes many forms, including current phenomena: 
traditional, nonalienating work processes are 
destroyed by competition with modern industry; 
agricultural communities are decimated by the 
On the issue of fragmentation of life, see readings 
listed in the preceding footnote as well as  Polanyi in 
[14] and [29, especially pp. 243-681. 
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introduction of new technology; cities grow and 
decay depending upon the vagaries of the market; 
urban inhabitants experience anomie because 
their communities are functionally fragmented. 
Community is not a good which can be produced 
for market sale. 
Because the capitalist controls the work process 
and his goal is profit maximization, there will be 
no tendency to minimize costs which fall on 
others. Indeed, for any given level of costs, there 
will be an effort to maximize the share of costs 
borne by others. These extramarket costs take the 
form of fracture of the community, water and air 
pollution, congestion, "urban sprawl," etc.-a 
general destruction of the environment which 
cannot be viewed as a secondary issue but one of 
dominant importance in the society. Furthermore, 
capitalists' efforts to choose technology and to 
organize production so as to minimize their own, 
but not social, costs insures that the importance 
of the problem increases over time. (The rich are 
often able to protect themselves from pollution, 
by zoning for example.) Thus the rise in concern 
regarding problems of pollution is in no way 
surprising, nor should i t  be surprising that anti- 
pollution groups make headway only when the 
problems become severe. To halt the destruction 
of the environment, i t  would be necessary to re- 
strict seriously the operation of basic capitalist 
institutions. Thus human needs become subordi- 
nated to the needs of the market and to capital 
expansion. 
Imperialism. Subordination of human needs to 
the needs of capital expansion has been a perva- 
sive characteristic of capitalist growth, and this 
process has been carried out, not only domesti- 
cally, but also on an international scale. The geo- 
graphic spread of capitalism derives from the 
operations of its basic institutions. First, the 
individual gain rationale of capitalism leads con- 
stantly in search of new sources of profits. For the 
firm, continued well-being depends upon finding 
new, profitable uses for its previously accrued 
profits. Second, the opportunities for assuring the 
availability of such investment opportunities are 
greater, the greater is the geographic scope of the 
system. 
The spreading of the system has been a char- 
acteristic of capitalism throughout its history. 
I t  has involved breaking down the restrictions on 
the operation of the market, on the capitalist con- 
trol of the work process, and on the system of indi- 
vidual gain. Earlier, the problem was one of 
creating nations and then spheres of influence. 
Today, when one capitalist nation has become 
dominant, the problem is one of integrating an 
international capitalist system. This integration 
means a t  a minimum that the nefarious aspects of 
capitalism-inequality, alienation, destruction of 
environment-are spread, or, insofar as they 
already exist, they are maintained. However, 
because this integration takes place under the 
dominance of the business interests of an ad- 
vanced capitalist nation, the output expansion 
capacity of capitalism is not necessarily trans- 
mitted to the poorer countries. First, simply the 
operation of comparative advantage which 
operates in an integrated capitalist system would 
inhibit industrialization and growth in poor 
countries. Second, the monopolistic conditions 
of business in the United States allow even less 
opportunity for development in poor countries. 
Because of its power, which operates both within 
and outside the market, U.S. business (or business 
from other advanced capitalist nations) is able 
to preempt investment opportunities and inhibit 
the development of a historically progressive 
industrial bourgeoisie in the poor countries. 
Finally, the interests of international capital re- 
quire the maintenance of a "favorable investment 
climate" and so the state power of advanced 
countries is used to prevent radical political and 
social change in poor countr ie~ .~  
Racism. Racism in the United States can be 
seen as functionally supportive of the interests of 
capital. In  our discussion of alienation, we as- 
serted that the segmentation and stratification of 
the labor force is one mechanism by which labor is 
prevented from obtaining a higher wage for under- 
taking less desirable jobs. Black people clearly 
comprise one of the most oppressed segments of 
the labor force in the United States. They are 
restricted to the most undesirable jobs and they 
are paid the lowest wages. 
I t  is often alleged that white workers benefit 
from racism and that the losers are the capitalists 
who are prevented by racism from hiring blacks. 
Such an allegation is true, if a t  all, only in the 
static sense when total labor income is b e d .  The 
division of the labor force by race, however, 
weakens the position of workers as a group, and 
their share of income is consequently reduced. 
Demands by white workers are attenuated by the 
threat of being replaced by workers from the black 
labor po01.~ 
a Useful references putting forth the radical analysis 
of imperialism include [56] [36] [ la]  [2] [32]. On the 
history of U.S. imperialism, see [31] (611 [47]. 
9 Michael Reich, in his investigation of the relation- 
ship between racism and class divisions, has found that 
racial inequality between blacks and whites (as mea- 
sured by the difference between white and nonwhite 
median incomes) is significantly and positively related 
to class inequality among whites (as measured by the 
Gini coefficient for white incomes). See [53, Chap. VII  
and passim]. 
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Furthermore, antagonisms of white workers are 
directed by racism towards blacks rather than 
towards employers; that is, institutionalized 
racism dilutes awareness of class divisions. When 
the animosity of white workers is directed against 
blacks, the white workers see themselves as hav- 
ing a stake in the system-they are not a t  the bot- 
tom. 
The Subjugation o f  Women. The segmentation 
of the labor force, of course, involves many divi- 
sions other than race. Extensive division by 
"skill" and education categories is of obvious 
importance. The division by sex and the concomi- 
tant subjugation of women pervade the entire 
society. I n  this paper we will only point out that 
there are many parallels to racism, and the points 
we have made above, especially those regarding 
the functional role of stratitication in allowing low 
wages to be paid for undesirable work, are again 
relevant. Indeed, for most of their labor, namely, 
housework, women receive no wages as such and 
have very little choice in the matter [46] [S]. 
Summary. I n  this section we have suggested 
arguments regarding the relationship between 
important social problems and the institutions of 
a capitalist society. We believe that the general 
analysis forms a basic component in a radical 
approach to economics. The points we would like 
to emphasize in summary are the following: 
1. The negative characteristics which we have 
ascribed to capitalism are completely compatible 
with successful, rapid expansion of output. In- 
deed, i t  is in the very process of yielding a maxi- 
mum output (maximum profit) situation that 
the institutions of capitalism yield income in- 
equality and alienation, for example. Thus, the 
analysis is only in small part based upon the oc- 
currence of business cycles, unemployment, etc. 
I n  essence, the critique is fully applicable when 
the capitalist economy is in boom. And however 
one may value output versus other variables 
which contribute to welfare, it seems obvious that 
the greater the output, the less valuable i t  is 
relative to the other variables. Thus a capitalist 
society becomes increasingly less tolerable. 
2. The core institutions of capitalism interact 
I 
I in such a way as to determine social relations and 
' circumscribe the outcomes of conflict situations. First, these institutions work in a parallel fashion 
to produce a class society. Reliance on individual 
gain incentives, capitalist control of the produc- 
~ tion process, and the legal relations of ownership 
insure that capitalist development will produce 
division into classes. Second, the core institutions 
are highly interdependent in that they sustain 
and facilitate the operation of each other; the 
functional interrelations are such that severe 
alteration of any one is incompatible with main- 
taining the others. 
3. The acceptance of capitalist institutions 
carries with i t  certain constraints on the function- 
ing of the society. These constraints usually take 
the form of conflicts between alternative social 
needs. For example, the trade-off between output 
growth and income equality exists within the 
context of capitalism. The trade-off is created by 
the functional requisites of the institutions. But 
we can easily imagine a society in which such a 
trade-off would not exist. Such would be the case 
if men worked because they cared for and felt on 
equal terms with the entire community rather 
than if they worked for direct personal gain. Other 
examples of such generally accepted trade-offs, 
which are artifacts of capitalism, include income 
growth versus a meaningful work environment, 
employment versus stable prices, private versus 
social costs, public versus private consumption, 
and income versus leisure. 
4. The core capitalist institutions tend to sub- 
ordinate other institutions to serve their needs. 
We have illustrated with the case of education 
(other examples would be the family and religion) 
how other institutions serve the needs of the 
economy. I n  this sense, capitalism may be char- 
acterized as an "economic society." 
There are, of course, limits to the extent to 
which capitalist institutions shape society, and a 
curriculum based only on the argument to this 
point would certainly be deficient. Thus, we now 
turn to a consideration of the exercise of power- 
in particular, the role of the state-in the context 
of capitalist institutions. 
111. The Exercise o j  Power 
Class Divisions in  Capitalist Society. As we have 
noted, the development and operation of capital- 
ist institutions divides society into classes. First, 
class division is a prerequisite for the effective 
organization of the institutions: most of the popu- 
lation must be reduced to worker status while 
simultaneously a capitalist elite is created and its 
existence justified. Second, the basic institutions 
function so as to augment the wealth, power, and 
privilege of that elite. 
The analysis of economic institutions which 
leads to these conclusions provides a basis for 
examining the exercise of power-the ability of 
groups to resolve the outcomes of social conflict 
processes in their own favor. First, the analysis 
provides the working hypothesis that economic 
organization is the basis of power. Second, the 
analysis emphasizes that the different classes have 
conflicting interests with regard to the main- 
tenance of the existing social relations. Together, 
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these statements would lead us to hypothesize 
that power in a capitalist society is dominated by 
the capitalist class, and since social conilict may 
lead to instability in the institutions themselves, 
the class exercises power primarily to maintain 
the institutions which function in its favor. The 
intervention of power-to deflect political threats, 
depoliticize class conflict, and so forth-assures 
the smooth functioning of ~apital ism?~ 
The Operation o j  Ruling Class Power-The 
State. An example of the interaction between the 
operation of institutions and the exercise of power 
is provided by the recent history of welfare pro- 
grams. As we have pointed out in Section 11, an 
unequal income distribution results from the 
functioning of the labor market, the system of 
individual gain incentives, and the linking of in- 
come to ownership and sale of productive factors. 
There are, however, several secondary forces 
which exacerbate inequality, and the reality of 
capitalism is even worse than the model. First, 
there are many family units which own no salable 
labor or other factors of production: the sick, the 
aged, the disabled. Second, there are those who 
own labor power but who are discriminated 
against in the labor market: blacks, other non- 
whites, and women. Third, income inequalities 
are exacerbated by unequal access to activities 
through which labor quality is "improved" (e.g., 
schooling and apprenticeship). Fourth, unem- 
ployment is always present in a capitalist system, 
and its incidence falls heaviest on the groups 
already a t  the bottom of the income ladder." 
This situation poses a threat to capitalism. 
10 While we argue that power is dominated by the 
capitalist class, that is not to say that it monopolizes 
power or that its rule is unrestricted. Furthermore, 
capitalists need not monopolize decision-making posi- 
tions nor must they operate according to an articulated 
schema in order to be dominant. The existence of an 
ideology which favors capitalist interests and a suffi- 
ciently pervasive common set of objective self-interests 
among capitalists serves to assure that decisions will be 
in their favor. I t  is in this sense that we can identify the 
capitalist class as a ruling class. The dichotomous di- 
vision of society into workers and capitalists obviously 
involves a simplification. Other groups (e.g., highly 
paid professionals, land-owning farmers, etc.) exist who 
cannot readily be identified directly with either class. 
However, we use the term "worker" broadly to identify 
all who sell their labor power on a market and therefore 
the class categories extend to most of the population. 
Furthermore, our preceding analysis of capitalist in- 
stitutions and our analysis below of the exercise of 
power lead us to the conclusion that these are the most 
important groups to study for understanding social 
change. On the American ruling class, see (54, Chap. 
91 [45] [16]; on the nature of classes, see [57] 181 [4]. 
11 Miller [44] provides a good description of these 
secondary forces. For a left critique of Miller, see [30]. 
Those affected have no stake in maintaining the 
system and become unruly. The preservation of 
capitalism requires that the misery of poverty be 
alleviated, or a t  least that something be done 
about its appearance. Yet an attack on the basic 
causes of the problem, the functioning of the basic 
economic institutions, is ruled out. For example, 
an adequate welfare program would interfere with 
work incentives; it  would conflict with the prin- 
ciple that income is a payment for productive 
factors. Therefore, political power is focused on 
the secondary factors and symptoms, but the 
basic processes remain unaffected. Old age pen- 
sion programs are established; equal opportunity 
employment regulations are legislated; man- 
power training programs are set up; unemploy- 
ment compensation schemes are developed. Even 
if such programs were successful on their own 
terms, they could eliminate only the most severe 
aspects of inequality and poverty. In  fact, most 
of these programs fail to achieve their own modest 
objectives. 
Opposition to system-preserving welfare pro- 
grams derives not only from their conflict with 
the institutions. Often, interest groups within the 
capitalist class or powerful professional groups are 
hurt by welfare legislation. Thus, the A.M.A. 
battles against medical care; housing developers 
oppose public housing programs and city plan- 
ning; the automobile companies work to keep 
public transit facilities inadequate; textile em- 
ployers subvert equal employment opportunity 
legislation. These are cases where class interests 
and self-interest seem to conflict. While the ruling 
class as a whole would benefit by establishing an 
ameliorative program and thereby securing its 
position, some of its members would be hurt. Thus 
because ruling class solidarity (see below) is a t  
least as important for the preservation of that 
system as is preventing disruption by the poor, 
inadequate welfare programs are the outcome. 
Welfare programs are but one example of 
ruling-class functioning-taking action, compro- 
mising within itself, absorbing discontent- 
carried out through the state. Other revealing 
examples are public education, tariff policies, 
financing of research programs, agriculture and 
transportation subsidies, and the structure of 
taxation. We believe that these operations of the 
state are best understood if the state is viewed as 
basically operating in the interests of the capital- 
ist class.la 
12 Sweezy [55,  Chap. 131 provides a good statement 
of this view of the state. The classic argument is pro- 
vided by Lenin [33, especially Part I] [34]. 
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The Priorities of the State. If, as according to our 
hypothesis, the state is dominated by the capital- 
ist class, then the operations of the state should 
reflect the needs of the capitalist class. In  modern 
capitalist states, when the basic institutions have 
been thoroughly established, the maintenance 
and preservation of these institutions upon which 
the structure of class and privilege depends is of 
the greatest importance to the capitalist class. 
The uninhibited operation of the economic insti- 
tutions will continue to bestow power, wealth, 
and prestige upon the capitalists. They do not 
need the state to enhance their position, only to 
assure it. 
The system-preserving function of the state is 
evident in several areas. A continued threat to 
capitalism has been the failure of the economy 
autonomously to generate adequate aggregate 
demand. This failure has brought recurring crises 
with substantial unemployment. I n  spite of once 
seemingly inviolable ideological objections to the 
contrary, the state has assumed the function of 
demand regulator. Such regulation does not elimi- 
nate unemployment, but simply reduces it to levels 
which are not system threatening. 
A second system-preserving function of the 
state has been its decisive role in obfuscation and 
suppression of class conflict. This is accomplished 
through suppressing system-threatening groups 
(e.g., the Wobblies, Black Panthers), by deflect- 
ing their demands for structural changes into 
acceptable material demands (e.g., labor union 
economism, black capitalism), or through ameli- 
orative programs. If we may modify the jargon 
of public finance, state actions such as suppression 
or amelioration may be viewed as "class goods." 
When the challenge posed by workers becomes 
severe, no single capitalist can protect himself. 
Were he to give concessions to his workers, his 
competitive position would be endangered. To 
employ private armies has been possible but 
highly inefficient. Thus, action by the capitalists 
as a class is necessary. 
The enormous military establishment provides 
another example of system-preserving state oper- 
ations; as such, it performs a dual function. First, 
it provides the rationale for huge expenditures 
which serve to maintain aggregate demand with- 
out threatening the security or position of any 
group in the ruling class. For example, social wel- 
fare measures often do threaten such groups. 
Second, as the capitalist system becomes increas- 
ingly an international system, the military di- 
rectly protects the far-flung parts of that system 
,- 7 
13 1. 
The response of the state to changes in the 
process of production which require more highly 
developed labor, illustrates a second priority of 
the state; namely, the creation of new institu- 
tions. The rise of mass education in the United 
States has occurred in response to the need by 
industry for a skilled work force?s Because work- 
ers are not tied to particular employment, indi- 
vidual capitalists cannot invest in the general 
training of workers and expect to appropriate the 
returns. Thus, capitalists turn to the state to 
provide a skilled work force. When education is 
handled by the state and portrayed as social wel- 
fare, it is paid for by general tax revenue rather 
than by the capitalists themselves [35, Chap. 31 
[511 [431 [gl 1601. 
The structure of the educational system betrays 
its class-oriented genesis. Mass education in the 
United States covers a vast quality range, and a 
positive association has been established between 
parents' incomes or class and the quality of public 
education which children receive. If, as seems 
reasonable, the benefits of education are corre- 
lated with the quality of that education, then the 
class bias of U.S. education is obvious. Thus the 
educational system operates to reinforce the class 
bias of the core economic institutions." 
There is a further aspect of the educational 
function which reveals its class bias; namely, its 
role in transmitting ideology. Students are taught 
a view of society which justifies the status quo 
and which poses efforts for change as unnecessary 
or futile. 
The primacy of the roles of the state in preserv- 
ing the system and in developing new institutions 
to meet changing circumstances should not ob- 
scure the fact that the state also intervenes di- 
1' See, for example, [ l l ]  [13,. pp. 23-57]. 
11 The relationship between inequalities in schooling 
and inequalities in the totaI income distribution may be 
expressed as follows. Let Y represent individual income, 
K represent earnings from capital, and L represent 
earnings from labor. If we let the variance of Y over the 
mean Y represent our measure of income inequality, it 
can easily be seen that 
Y 
On the plausible assumption that most of the inequal- 
ities in labor earnings are due to inequalities in skills, 
education, and the general socialization process, we see 
that inequalities in schooling may contribute to income 
inequality, even where school inequalities are not asso- 
ciated with inequalities in capital ownership. However, 
note that the last term on the right-hand side of the 
above expression represents the contribution to total 
income inequality of the degree to which inequalities 
in capital earnings are associated with inequalities in 
labor earnings. Given the social class inequalities of our 
educational system, we expect the covariance term to 
be positive. 
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rectly in the economy to benefit immediate inter- 
ests of capitalists. The most significant realm- 
in quantitative terms-where the state intervenes 
is in military and space spending, which we 
discussed above.16 
Another example of direct intervention, one 
which illustrates the case particularly well, is the 
government's relation to the agricultural sector. 
The general picture of what has happened in agri- 
culture is well known. Wages in agriculture have 
remained low and unemployment high. Subsis- 
tence farmers have been unable to survive. The 
rural poor have been forced into the urban 
ghettos, supplying the low-cost labor force for 
industrial expansion. All the while, large farmers 
have received subsidies, price supports, and pro- 
tection [I]. 
Furthermore, the very process which creates 
the agricultural problem is exacerbated by gov- 
ernment programs. Government expenditure on 
agricultural research and extension has played a 
signscant role in raising agricultural produc- 
tivity a t  a more rapid rate than general produc- 
tivity and has thereby contributed to the mass- 
dislocation of rural workers and subsistence 
farmers. Those statistical studies which are avail- 
able confirm casual empiricism: the overall impact 
of the government in its agricultural programs 
has been to increase inequality within the agricul- 
tural sector [7] [lo]. 
The point is, however, not only that the process 
has worked toward increasing inequality but that 
it is the large owners of property-of the agricul- 
tural means of production-who benefit. Their 
benefit is derived directly from the programs 
which have been developed for "helping agricul- 
ture." Payment for unused land is of no help to 
rural laborers. Price supports for marketable 
surplus is of no help to subsistence farmers. Gov- 
ernment subsidies for capital-augmenting tech- 
nical change have the same class bias. 
Military spending, agricultural subsidies, and 
other such programs provide ample ammunition 
for the muckraker. However, in terms of their 
importance in the overall operations of the state, 
we believe they are not of highest priority. Their 
position is behind the system-preserving and 
secondary-institutions-creating roles of the state. 
Nonetheless, when studied as a group, these ac- 
tions of the state which directly enhance the 
privilege of the capitalist class reveal the basic 
character of the state in a capitalist society and 
provide a useful starting point for the analysis 
of po~er . '~  
18 For a documentation of the subsidies provided to 
military contractors, see [59] and Joint Economic Com- 
mittee (1969). 
Cohesiolt of the Ruling Class. The term "ruling 
class" may evoke the image of a small, conspira- 
torial group which coldly calculates the oppres- 
sion of the poor and its own gain. The actual 
functioning of the capitalist ruling class in the 
United States cannot, however, be well under- 
stood in such terms. 
A class operates as a class in a number of ways. 
First, the class can be conscious of itself as a 
group with common objective interests, and can 
function cohesively on the basis of that conscious- 
ness. Second, the class can hold in common a 
value system or ideology which justifies the class's 
position and serves as a guide to action. Third, 
the class can coalesce on specific issues which 
serve the interests of some of its members if the 
favor is returned when the special interests of 
other members are a t  issue. 
I n  general, it is difficult to distinguish which of 
these three mechanisms is a t  work a t  any given 
time. In  the case of the United States, all three 
mechanisms operate. For example, elite schools, 
class-segregated neighborhoods, and social clubs 
tend to instill in ruling class members a sense of 
identity and of their separateness from the rest of 
society. Thus, they become aware of their special 
stake in the status quo social relations and con- 
sciously work for the stability of the system. 
Obviously, if aware of their own position and if 
working toward a common goal, the members of 
the ruling class need not "conspire" to assure 
behavior in their common interest. 
On the other hand, the very strong capitalist 
ideology in the United States tends to make class 
consciousnessper se less important. A set of values 
that justify the position of the capitalist class, the 
basic institutions of capitalism, and the status quo 
in general provides a guide to action. Indeed, the 
prevalence of the capitalist ideology not only 
assures common action by members of the capital- 
ist class but means that others will cooperate to 
serve capitalist interests above their own. This 
is the case, for example, when white workers 
accept racism and reject a working-class con- 
sciousness. 
On many issues, logrolling furthers the class 
interest. This occurs when each group within the 
capitalist class structures its own policies so that 
they do not come into codic t  with other groups 
within the class, expecting (and receiving) such 
cooperation in return. 
16 I t  would be consistent with this theory if the state 
were to take some actions which, in terms of their direct 
impact, increased income equality, provided these ac- 
tions could be interpreted as serving the stability of the 
system. Lenin [33] analyzes the ten-hour day legislation 
in these terms. 
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These mechanisms which tie a class together 
should not be confused with the objective identity 
of the class itself. The  capitalist class in  the 
United States is a ruling class. The  degree to  
which it  has consciousness, a strong ideology, and 
internal cooperation determines how successfully 
it can rule." 
I IV. On Teaching and Practice 
So far we have limited our discussion to the 
content of a radical course. Radical substance, 
however, is only part of a radical approach to 
economics. First, college and university teachers 
work in one of the centers of radical social activity 
in the United States. Radical teachers should, 
therefore, view their own work as part of a wider 
radical movement. They should design their 
courses to  be relevant to  the concerns and needs 
of that  movement. Furthermore, radical econo- 
mists cannot be isolated as academics. Only by 
taking part in the activities of the radical move- 
ment can they integrate their scholarly work with 
the concerns of the movement. 
Second, teaching style is also relevant to  the 
radical approach. I n  Section I1 we suggested the 
argument that  one of the functions of the educa- 
tional system in the United States is to  prepare 
students for the authoritarian and repressive 
' 1  Readers of this paper may well ask to what extent 
we consider our approach Marxist. The following 
quotation seems relevant: 
". . . When asked whether or not we are Mads t ,  our 
position is the same as that of a physicist or a biologist 
when asked if he is a 'Newtonian' or if he is a 'Pas- 
teurian.' 
"There are truths so evident, so much a part of people's 
knowledge, that it is now useless to discuss them. One 
ought to be 'Marxist' with the same naturalness with 
which one is 'Newtonian' in Physics, or 'Pasteurian' in 
biology, considering that if facts determine new con- 
. cepts, these new concepts will never divest themselves 
of that portion of truth possessed by the older concepts 
they have outdated. Such is the case, for example, of 
Einsteinian relativity or Planck's 'quantum' theory 
with respect to the discoveries of Newton; they take 
nothing at  all away from the greatness of the learned 
Englishman. Thanks to Newton, physics was able to 
advance until it had achieved new concepts in space. 
The learned Englishman provided the necessary step- 
pingstones for them. 
"The advances in social and political science, as in other 
fields, belong to a long historical process whose links 
I are connecting, adding up, molding and constantly perfecting themselves. . . . 
1 "The merit of Marx is that he suddenly produces a qualitative change in the history of social thought. He 
interprets history, understands its dynamic, predicts 
the future, but in addition to predicting i t  (which would 
satisfy his scientific obligation) he expresses a revolu- 
tionary concept: the world must not only be inter- 
preted, it must be transformed." The statement is by 
Ernesto "Che" Guevara [25]. 
conditions of the work place. Obviously radicals 
cannot allow themselves to be part of such a 
socializing process. It is necessary for our own 
liberation as  well as  for the students' welfare to  
break down authoritarian relations in the class- 
room. The function of lectures, for example, in 
which one person talks a t  a mass of students, is, 
in general, antithetical to  radical teaching. Like- 
wise, radical teachers should challenge the grading 
system and the role which grades play in provid- 
ing a n  external incentive analogous to and pre- 
paratory for the wage system (see Appendix). 
I n  other words, teaching with a radical ap- 
proach to economics is not simply a matter of 
putting forth a certain interpretation of United 
States capitalism. A radical approach cames with 
it  certain lessons for change--lessons which must 
be followed in our teaching of economics. 
Skrlemnt on Grading by the Staff of Social 
Sciences 125 lo the Committee on 
Educational Policy* 
Grades serve a number of functions: they establish a 
system of incentives for students, they structure the 
nature of social relations in the educational process, 
and they provide needed information within and out- 
side the university. We argue that the incentive func- 
tion of grades and their effect on classroom relations are 
inimical to learning. Furthermore, we believe that the 
informational role of grades could be served through 
alternative mechanisms which would promote rather 
than hinder learning. 
Incentives. Learning should take place for desirable 
social ends and for the intrinsic enjoyment of learning. 
The grading process establishes an undesirable reward 
structure in which obtaining a high grade becomes the 
motivational force. The indirect reward of a good grade 
replaces the direct satisfaction from the process of 
learning or the resulting knowledge as the final objec- 
tive of many students. Such an incentive structure is 
undesirable in and of itself. 
However, the role of grades in educational institu- 
tions cannot be fully understood as long as attention is 
conhed to the universities alone. Grades function to 
socialize students into the work force. On a job, workers 
do not obtain satisfaction from an intrinsic interest 
either in the process of production or in the resulting 
product of their work. Nor do they obtain satisfaction 
from the social usefulness of the product. Instead, they 
are motivated by the prospect of an external reward- 
wages received in exchange for labor powers. In the 
workplace, the need to substitute external incentives 
for intrinsic interest arises because of the separation of 
The petition which follows was submitted to the 
Committee on Educational Policy of Haward Uni- 
versity by the Staff of Social Sciences 125 during the 
first term in which the course was offered. The petition 
was rejected. 
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the workers from control over the production process 
and its products. Grades play an important role in pre- 
paring young people for thii kind of work environment. 
We object to both an economic system and an educa- 
tional system which operate in this manner. 
The content of the knowledge acquired by a student 
is also affected by grades. Those aspects of any subject 
matter which can most easily be reduced to a single one- 
dimensional measure increase in importance-such as, 
for example, factual and quantifiable data. In the 
choice of paper topics, preference is given to small 
questions which can be easily researched and for which 
a complete answer can be developed in the limited time 
available. In order to assure a short-run payoff, the stu- 
dent tends to minimize risk by restricting hi field of 
inquiry. As a result, the larger framework and context 
of hi studies is taken for granted. Thus grades play 
a significant role in the perpetuation of the status quo 
in social inquiry. To this we object. 
Structure of Classroom Social Relations. The power 
to give grades provides professors with a sanction for the 
exercise of authority in the educational process. Grades 
promote acquiescence and conformity among students 
and exempt teachers from the necessity of being rele- 
vant, interesting, and well prepared in their classes. 
Students refrain from criticizing mediocrity and dull- 
ness in part because of the fear of jeopardizing their 
grades and in part because the process of grading has 
diverted attention away from learning itself. (We do 
not raise here the possibility that grades inspire political 
conformity between students and professors.) In gen- 
eral, the authoritarian relationship between teachers and 
students in the classroom is inimical to learning, and 
for this reason too we oppose grades. 
Information. The principal external consumers of the 
information contained in grades are employers and 
graduate schools, who need to identify the students 
they most prefer and the ones they least prefer. Grades 
provide employers and graduate schools with a costless 
means of ranking students for their own purposes. But 
education should not be made subservient to their 
needs, particularly since grades interfere with the 
learning process. Graduate schools and employers could 
devise their own mechanisms of evaluation and selec- 
tion if students were not graded, as already happens 
with students from a number of colleges, such as 
Antioch, which do not grade. 
Grades are also used to fill informational needs within 
the university. Students use grades to obtain feedback 
from their instructors on performance in class. Faculty 
members use grades from previous courses as guide- 
lines for admitting students to their own courses. The 
administration uses grades in allocating financial aid. 
Although we object to this last use of grades, we do 
feel that information on student performance can be 
useful both to the student and to the teacher in the 
educational process. The use of a summary letter grade 
is simply not the best means for fulfilling such in- 
formational needs. 
For a11 these reasons, we find the grading process ab- 
horrent, and we intend to substitute other mechanisms 
to perform those functions of grades that we feel 
should be retained. In our course we will prepare written 
evaluations of each student's work. The evaluation will 
be available to the student and to others if the student 
so requests. Further, we plan to arrange individual 
meetings between student and instructor during the 
semester. Finally, the organization of the course into 
small sections automatically provides continuous feed- 
back to the students. 
Therefore, we petition the Committee on Educational 
Policy to remove the grading requirement from our 
course. Further, we ask for a public hearing with the 
C.E.P. concerning both our petition and the general 
role of grades at  Harvard. We would like to raise at  
that point the arguments for the complete elimination 
of grades from the Harvard educational process. 
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